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Marinelli: Crimes and Punishment of the Alien: The Judicial Recommendation A

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT OF THE ALIEN:
THE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION
AGAINST DEPORTATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA)" provides for the deportation of aliens2 convicted of specific
crimes. In effect, this section renders the alien subject to two forms
of sanctions: the criminal sentence and deportation. One way to
avoid this seemingly harsh "double punishment" 3 is through the use
of a judicial recommendation against deportation. Section 241(b) of
the INA permits the court that convicts the alien of the crime to
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982) [hereinafter
INA]. In particular, these crimes include crimes involving moral turpitude (INA § 241(a)(4),
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982)), crimes relating to narcotic drugs (INA § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1 1) (1982)), crimes involving the illegal entry or the smuggling of aliens into the
United States (INA § 241(a)(2), (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2),(13) (1982)), crimes connected
with prostitution (INA § 241(a)(12), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(12) (1982)), and certain weapons
violations (INA § 241(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14) (1982)).
2. The INA defines an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1982). An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (resident alien) has been "lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws." INA §
101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1982).
3. Deportation is technically not punishment. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893). The dire consequences of deportation, however, left members of the Supreme
Court unconvinced that this action was not punishment. In Fong Yue Ting, the first case to
hold that deportation was not punishment but rather an administrative process to rid the country of undesirable aliens, a dissenting justice stated:
"If the banishment of an alien from a country. . . where he enjoys, under the laws,
a greater share of the blessings of personal security and personal liberty than he can
elsewhere hope for . . . be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."
149 U.S. at 740-41 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting President James Madison, 4 Elliot's Debates 555). Since deportation is not punishment, the phrase "double punishment" as used in
this Note should not be read in the strictest legal sense. For additional views of deportation
vis-a-vis punishment, see infra note 33. See also IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.1 (1985) (discussing the development and pattern of deportation statutes).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:357

recommend that the alien not be deported. 4 This section requires
that interested parties, including the prosecution authorities and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), be given notice of the proposed recommendation, and an opportunity to oppose
it.5 In addition, the recommendation must be made within thirty
days of the time of sentencing.6 Once made, the recommendation is
binding on the Service, and the criminal conviction may not be used
as a basis for deportation.7
Despite the statutory language of INA section 241(b), the federal circuit courts of appeals disagree on the scope and manner of
application of the judicial recommendation against deportation. It is
clear that the judicial recommendation, once made, means that an
alien's criminal conviction may not be used as the basis for deportation.8 The circuits differ, however, over whether the Service may
consider that conviction when ruling upon an alien's application for
discretionary relief 9 from deportation, such as an adjustment of sta4. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). The full text of the statute reads:
The provisions of subsection (a)(4) of this section respecting the deportation of an
alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply (1) in the case of any alien who
has subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional pardon by
the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States,
or (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of
first imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice
having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the
interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an
opportunity to make representations in the matter. The provisions of this subsection
shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from
the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this chapter.
The last sentence, referring to subsection (a) (1 1), renders the recommendation inapplicable to
aliens convicted of narcotics offenses. INA § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1982). See
Rehman v. INS, 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976); Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786 (Ist Cir. 1976);
Yuen v. INS, 406 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1969) (all holding that judicial recommendation is inapplicable to narcotics offenses described in § 1251(a)(11)).
5. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). See Judicial Recommendations Against
Deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1986) (notice must be received at least five days prior to court
hearing on recommendation against deportation).
6. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982).
7. Hailer v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1968) ("sentencing court's recommendation, if made in accordance with the statute, must be followed").
8. Id.
9. Compare Gimbanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1976) (Service may not use prior
conviction when ruling upon adjustment of status, a discretionary measure) with DelgadoChavez v. INS 765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985) (Service may consider a prior conviction for
which a recommendation has been obtained in ruling upon discretionary matter). "Discretion"
is not defined by the INA, but see In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), stating that
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tus' ° or voluntary departure.1" Because compliance with statutory re12

quirements is not enough to warrant a grant of discretionary relief,
the alien must also prove, both through the presence of favorable
factors and the absence of adverse factors, that administrative discretion should be exercised on his or her behalf.' 3 A prior criminal
conviction would necessarily constitute an adverse factor to be considered, 4 if the Service were allowed to consider it in spite of the
judicial recommendation. A prior conviction for which a recommendation against deportation has been obtained, however, would not
mandate a denial of discretionary relief.15
Another area of disagreement among the circuits involves the
statutory requirements that the judicial recommendation be made
within thirty days of sentencing, and that the Service be given notice
of the proposed recommendation.' Although most courts have
discretionary relief necessitates a balancing of "the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his
behalf." Id. at 584.
10. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982) provides for the adjustment of status of an alien
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if: (1) the alien applies for the
adjustment; (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissble to the
United States for permanent residence; and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to
him at the time his application is filed. The Attorney General may adjust status in his discretion. Id. (emphasis added).
11. For an explanation of voluntary departure, see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
12. In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980) (stating that alien must not only
establish that he is statutorily eligible but also is worthy of discretionary relief); In re Main,
16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) (demonstrating statutory eligibility for discretionary
relief not sufficient for grant of such relief); In re Bias, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626, 629-30, 640-43
(BIA 1974) (meeting objective prerequisites for discretionary relief is not sufficient for grant
of such relief).
13. In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980); In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
581, 587 (BIA 1978); In re Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 495-96 (BIA 1970).
14. See In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980). The alien in Seda pled guilty to
the crime of forgery, and in deportation proceedings applied for discretionary relief from deportation. Id. at 554. The Board of Immigration Appeals stated that although the guilty plea
did not render the alien ineligible for discretionary relief, it was a significant adverse factor to
be considered. Id.
15. See In re Gonzalez, 16 1. & N. Dec. 134, 136 (BIA 1977). Under § 101(f)(3) of the
INA, a person is precluded from establishing good moral character if he has been convicted of,
or admits the commission of, a crime involving moral turpitude during the statutory period in
which he is required to be a person of good moral character. INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(f)(3) (1982). The Board of Immigration Appeals in Gonzalez stated, however, that an
alien who has a conviction for which a recommendation against deportation has been made
should not be precluded by INA § 101(f)(3) from establishing good moral character. In re
Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 134, 136 (BIA 1977).
16. INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982).
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strictly applied these requirements, 17 one circuit has proposed that
the requirements should be disregarded in certain situations,18 and a
dissenting opinion has persuasively argued that the requirements
should not be strictly construed."9
In an attempt to resolve the disputes surrounding the judicial
recommendation against deportation, this Note will first examine the
history and language of the INA provision at issue. Second, the tendency of some courts to expand the applicability of the provision will
be analyzed. This Note concludes that interpreting the judicial recommendation as binding in an alien's request for discretionary relief
is contrary to both the language and purpose of the statute. In addition, this Note concludes that the recommendation's thirty-day time
limit and notice requirement may be relaxed in certain circumstances20 and still comport with the legislative purpose of the statute
and with principles of statutory construction.
II.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL
RECOMMENDATION AGAINST DEPORTATION

Deportation is a matter of legislative policy.2 1 Although an alien
17.

Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Marin v. INS, 438 F.2d 932

(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); United States ex rel Piperkoff v. Esperdy,
267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926);
Ex parte Eng, 77 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Cal. 1948); In re Plata, 14 I. & N. Dec. 462 (BIA 1973);
In re I-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 426 (BIA 1954).
18. Cerujo v. INS, 570 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1978). See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. An earlier Second Circuit case had previously disregarded the notice requirement,
but limited its holding to the facts of that case. Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.
1968).
19. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Fahy, J.,dissenting).
20. The circumstances upon which the 30-day time limit and requirement of notice may
be relaxed are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
21. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In Kleindienst, the Court stated:
"The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and
to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive
officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications."
Id. at 766-67 (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895)). The
government's power to deport was challenged in the case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Nation's sovereign power
allowed the federal government to establish conditions and procedures regulating the entrance
or deportation of aliens. Id. at 713, 731. See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)
and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1895) (both upholding the federal government's power to deport); United States ex rel Zapp v. District Director of Immigration and
Naturalization, 120 F.2d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1941) ("expulsion of aliens is a sovereign power
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who acquires resident status in this country is "entitled to the same
protection of life, liberty, and property as a citizen, he acquires no
vested right to remain," 22 and the government has the power to deport him if public interests so require.2" The Immigration and Nationality Act recognizes nineteen grounds upon which an alien may
be deported.24 One such ground includes any alien convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry and either sentenced to confinement, or confined in a prison or
corrective institution, for a year or more.25 Various crimes, such as
those that involve evil or predatory intent or the element of fraud,
have been held to be crimes involving moral turpitude.26
necessary to the safety of the country, to be regulated by the legislative department"). For a
comprehensive discussion on the history of deportation, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS.
THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 96-101 (1980) [hereinafter TARNISHED DOOR].
22. United States v. Sui Joy, 240 F. 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1917).
23. Id. For a summary of the rights of aliens and restrictions thereon, see I C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, § 1.34a-.46.
24. INA § 241(a)(l)-(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(19) (1982). In actuality, it is deceptive to say that there are only 19 grounds upon which an alien may be deported. Many of the
19 grounds encompass multiple groups. For example, INA § 241 (a)(1) provides for the deportation of any alien who was excludable at the time of entry. INA § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1) (1982). There are 33 grounds upon which an alien is excludable at the time of
entry. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). This also includes aliens who were excludable
under the law that was in effect at the time of their entry. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, § 4.lb. It has been estimated that there are now 700 grounds for deportation. Id.
25. INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982). The full text states that any alien
shall be deported who
is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a year or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of
two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme or criminal
misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the
convictions were in a single trial.
Id. According to this statute, "sentenced to confinement" includes a suspended sentence. See,
e.g., Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that essential element is imposition of sentence rather than actual serving of sentence); United States ex rel.
Fells v. Garfinkel, 158 F. Supp. 524, 525 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (stating that by distinguishing
between "sentenced to confinment" and "confined therefore," § 241(a)(4) includes sentences
where there is no actual imprisonment). A prerequisite for deportation under INA § 241(a)(4)
is that the alien must actually be convicted of the crime or crimes. A guilty plea, or nolo
contendere plea, will suffice as a conviction. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)
(stating that plea of guilty is a conviction); In re Fortis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 576, 577 (BIA 1974)
(stating that nolo contendere plea, when accepted by the court, is the equivalent of a plea of
guilty). For a comprehensive discussion of deportation for crimes involving moral turpitude,
see Wexler & Neet, The Alien Criminal Defendant: An Examination Of Immigration Law
Principles For Criminal Law Practice, 10 CRIM. L. BULL 289, 294-313 (1974).
26. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, § 4.14(d) (discussing crimes
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In addition to specifying the grounds for deportation of aliens,
the INA includes provisions for granting relief from deportation, 1
including the judicial recommendation against deportation. Although
there is no legislative history regarding the judicial recommendation
provision of the INA, a Senate Report was prepared in connection
with a similar provision of the Immigration Act of 1917,28 a predecessor act of the INA. According to that report, the purpose of the
judicial recommendation was to prevent a resident alien from being
deported after he or she had already served a sentence for a crime.2 9
Several courts have expounded upon Congress' motivations for
adopting the judicial recommendation as a mode of granting relief
from deportation. In Kolios v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,30 a federal court of appeals stated that the judicial recommendation is "motivated as much by mercy as by rehabilitation."3' 1 Similarly, another court proposed that by enacting this provision,
Congress recognized that mitigating circumstances might exist that
would make the imposition of deportation a harsh penalty. 32 Thus,
the legislative purpose of the judicial recommendation, as interpreted
by the courts, reflects a desire to prevent the alien's "double punishinvolving moral turpitude, such as blackmail, forgery, robbery, and embezzlement). See also
Aberson, Deportation of Aliens for Criminal Conviction, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 52, 59-66
(1974) and Wexler & Neet, supra note 25, at 294-304 (both discussing moral turpitude as it
pertains to deportation statutes).
27. In addition to adjustment of status and voluntary departure as means of relief from
deportation, the INA provides for suspension of deportation (INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1254(a)(1) (1982)) and political asylum (INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982)) (both discretionary measures), and withholding of deportation (INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982))
(mandatory if statutory prerequisites are established).
28. Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889 (current version at
INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982)), which states that in the case of an alien committing a crime of moral turpitude,
deportation [shall not] be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing
such alien for such crime shall [at the time of sentencing or within thirty days], due
notice having first been given to representatives of the State, make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of
this Act[.]
29. S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong. 1st Sess., 15 (1916).
30. 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1976).
31. Id. at 789.
32. Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The court in Tutrone stated that "it is plain that Congress did not believe that public policy required a rigid
and inflexible application of technical definitions." Id. The mitigating factors in Tutrone included the fact that the alien had spent 59 of his 61 years in the United States, his orientation
was toward the United States, and he had no ties with Italy (the country to which he would be
deported). Id. at 438.
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ment" of serving a criminal sentence and then being deported. 33
Section 241 (b)(2) of the INA requires that the judicial recommendation against deportation be made within thirty days of the resident alien's sentencing.3" This provision was also carried over from
the Immigration Act of 1917.3 5 The legislative history of the earlier
Act reveals that the thirty-day time limit was included to assure that
the trial judge makes a well-informed recommendation on the basis

of facts and considerations which are fresh in his or her mind. 6 The
House debates also reveal a concern that absent a time limit, a situation might arise where the sentencing judge would no longer be
available, and a different judge who had not presided over the original trial and was unfamiliar with the facts would make a recommendation.37 An additional concern was that pressure might be exerted
on a judge if he were free to recommend against deportation a long
time after sentencing.38 Thus, although one Representative proposed
an amendment that a recommendation could be made at any time
after sentencing," the time limit was included in the 1917 Act.
Courts have not elaborated on the legislative intent for either the
thirty-day limit or the notice requirement, but they have strictly en-

forced these requirements, even when deportation under the circum33. Although deportation is not punishment, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 730 (1893), it has been described as a "'drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile . . . .It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country.
Such a forfeiture is a penalty.'" Jordon v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (quoting Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154
(1945) ("That deportation is a penalty - at times a most serious one - cannot be doubted.");
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation is equivalent to the
loss of property and life, or all that makes life worth living). For an analysis of deportation as
not being violative of constitutional rights, see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952) (holding that deportation does not violate due process or first amendment rights and is
not punishment).
34. INA § 241(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1982).
35. See supra note 28.
36. 53 CONG. REc. 5171 (1916).
37. Id. at 5170 (statement of Rep. Howard).
38. 53 CONG. Rac. 5170 (1916) (statements of Rep. Hayes). Although the House debates do not reveal who would exert this pressure, it could be assumed that family or friends
might try to persuade a judge to issue a recommendation long after the alien's sentencing. In
addition, a judge might be persuaded by political or humanitarian concerns to issue a recommendation against deportation after the alien had served his sentence. One representative,
however, expressly discounted the notion that a judge might succumb to such pressure. 53
CONG. REc. 5170 (1916) (statements of Rep. Bennet) (stating that "if a man has not strong
enough moral fiber to resist that sort of pressure, he ought not to be a judge," and that judges
"are not improperly swayed by pressure").
39. 53 CONG. REc. 5169 (1916) (amendment of Rep. Sabath).
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stances constituted a harsh penalty.4"
III. THE MODERN CASE LAW TREND TOWARD BROADENING THE
SCOPE OF THE RECOMMENDATION AGAINST DEPORTATION

Once a recommendation against deportation is made, it is binding on the Service, and a resident alien's criminal conviction cannot
be used as a basis for deportation. 41 The Third Circuit has decided
that a recommendation is also binding in discretionary matters, and
that the Service may not use a criminal conviction, for which a recommendation has been obtained, to support denial of discretionary
relief.42 The Third Circuit's broad interpretation of the scope of the
judicial recommendation is directly opposed by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the holdings of the Ninth Circuit. 4
A.

Case Law Analysis of the Scope of the Judicial
Recommendation

In Giambanco v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,44 the
Third Circuit held that where a judicial recommendation against deportation is made, the alien's prior conviction cannot be used by the
Service to deny discretionary relief.45 The alien in Giambanco was
originally convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States Government by entering into a fraudulent marriage in order to stay in
the United States. 46 The judge recommended that the conviction not
be a basis for deportation.47 After that marriage was terminated, the
alien married another United States citizen (the daughter of one of
his co-conspirators in the fraud), and petitioned to adjust his status
to that of permanent resident alien. 48 The Service denied the alien's
adjustment of status petition on the basis of the prior fraud
40. See, e.g., Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("[D]eportation . . . will now occur because of failings in the trial judge and petitioner's trial
counsel . . . . Deportation here would be harsh and unjustifiable.").

41.

See supra text accompanying note 7.

42.

Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141, 145-47 (3d Cir. 1976).

43.

Delgado-Chavez v. INS, 765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985); Jew Ten v, INS, 307 F.2d

832 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 968 (1963); In re Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 134

(BIA 1977).
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
tus). For

531 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1976).

Id. at 149.
Id. at 146 n.8.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing adjustment of staa definition of permanent resident, see supra note 2.
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conviction.49
In holding that the recommendation is binding in discretionary
measures, such as an adjustment of status, the Third Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise would obviate the statutory requirement
that the Service be given notice and an opportunity to oppose the
trial court's proposed recommendation.5" According to this reasoning, the Service could simply allow the trial court to make its recommendation, and then in effect overturn this recommendation as a
matter of discretion at a later proceeding, by denying discretionary
relief.5 ' Furthermore, because the legislative history did not address
the issue of whether a recommendation against deportation is binding in discretionary measures, the court resolved the doubts in favor
of the alien because deportation is such a drastic and possibly unjust
penalty.52
In In re Gonzalez,5" a case arising in the Third Circuit after the
Giambanco decision, the alien was convicted of conspiring to pose as
a Service employee and to obtain money from other aliens fraudulently, 4 but he received a recommendation against deportation.55
Subsequently, the Service ruled that Gonzalez was deportable for
overstaying his visa under INA section 241(a)(2).56 Gonzalez then
applied for voluntary departure in order to circumvent the deportation order, 7 but the Service denied this application because of his
49.

531 F.2d at 145-46. See id. at 146 n.8 ("Considering the entire record ...

we do

not find such outstanding equities such great merit in this case as to warrant the favorable
exercise of discretion ....

.

50.
51.

Id. at 147.
Id.

52.

Id. at 148 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). But cf. id. at

146 n.8 (trial court pointed out that the alien and his wife were married for a short time, wife
knew of his legal problems when she married him, and alien also had full knowledge that he

was in the U.S. illegally and had a prior fraud conviction).
53.
54.

16 I. & N. Dec. 134 (BIA 1977).
Id. at 136.

55. Id. at 135.
56.

Id. at 134-35.

57. Id. at 135. See also INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982), which states:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation

proceedings.

. .

to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in

lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney

General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least five
years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure .

...

Id. Voluntary departure, like INA § 245 adjustment of status, supra note 10, is a discretionary
measure and is permitted only in meritorious cases. Muigai v. INS, 682 F.2d 334, 336-37 (2d

Cir. 1982). The purpose and effect of voluntary departure is that it: (1) avoids the stigma of
deportation; (2) enables the alien to select his own destination; and (3) facilitates the possibil-
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prior conviction. 8 On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) reversed the Service's decision on the basis of Giambanco.5 9
Although the BIA considered itself bound to apply the Giambanco
holding because Gonzalez had arisen in the Third Circuit, 60 it expressed its strong disagreement with Giambanco.61
In disagreeing with the broadening of INA section 241(b), the
BIA emphasized that the Immigration Act nowhere prohibits criminal activity, and the resulting conviction, from being considered in
an application for discretionary relief.62 In addition, the BIA pointed
out that in order to qualify for a grant of voluntary departure under
INA Section 244(e), an alien must establish good moral character. 8
Although the BIA conceded that a prior conviction for which a recommendation against deportation has been obtained does not preclude the alien from establishing good moral character, 64 it stated
that the Service should be allowed to examine all evidence - including criminal convictions - in determining how to exercise its.
discretion. 5 By not allowing immigration judges to analyze all competing factors in deciding a discretionary matter, the BIA reasoned,
Giambanco's broadening of section 241(b) denies immigration
judges the flexibility they need to weigh the merits of a case
sensitively.66
Fourteen years prior to Giambanco, the Ninth Circuit held that
INA section 241(b), on its face, applies only to deportation proceedings and, therefore, is not binding in applications for discretionary
relief.67 In a more recent case, Delgado-Chavez v. Immigration and
ity of the alien's return to the United States. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD. supra note 3, §
7.2a.
58.
59.

16 I. & N. Dec. at 135.
Id. at 136.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. See INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C.

§

1254(e) (1982); supra note 57 and accompanying

text.
64.
65.
66.
67.

16 I. & N. Dec. at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
See Id.
Jew Ten v. INS, 307 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 968 (1963).

The court in Jew Ten stated that "[a]s we read § 241(b), taking cognizance of its history, it
can only mean that the sentencing court is limited to making recommendations in § 241(a)(4)

convictions." Id. at 834. Accord United States v. George, 534 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a § 241(b) application where convicted alien
was deportable for overstaying his visa under INA § 241(a)(2)).
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Naturalization Service,68 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
Giambanco and reaffirmed its earlier holding.
In Delgado-Chavez, the alien had been convicted of embezzlement, but the state court judge issued a recommendation against deportation.6 9 When Delgado-Chavez subsequently overstayed his visa,
he conceded deportability under INA section 241 (a)(2).70 At the deportation hearing, however, he requested voluntary departure in lieu
of deportation. 71 The Service denied the request for voluntary departure, citing the alien's prior conviction.7 2 In holding that consideration of the embezzlement conviction was not erroneous, 73 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals mirrored the BIA's position in Gonzalez; it
found the conviction to be relevent to a determination of the alien's
good moral character, a necessary element for the grant of voluntary
departure. 74 Furthermore, the court rejected the Third Circuit's
Giambanco reasoning, based on the plain language of section
241(b), 8 although it found that reasoning to be "not without
6
appeal. ' '7
B. Should the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation Be
Binding in DiscretionaryMatters?
Congress' purpose of preventing the double punishment of an
alien who serves a criminal sentence and is then deported7 7 seems to
bolster Delgado-Chavez's plain language reasoning that the recommendation pertains only to deportation proceedings brought against
an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.78 The Su68.

765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985).

69.
70.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 868-69.

71.

Id. at 869. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explanation of voluntary

departure).
72.
73.
74.

765 F.2d at 869.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 869.

75.

765 F.2d at 870.

76.

Id. For a discussion of Giambanco's reasoning, see supra text accompanying notes

50-51.
77. See supra text accompanying note 29.
78. 765 F.2d at 870. The court in Delgado-Chavez reasoned that the plain language of

the judicial recommendation provision limited its application to deportation proceedings under
INA § 241(a)(4) (crimes involving moral turpitude), stating that the provision "on its face

applies not to applications for [discretionary relief], but only to deportation proceedings based
upon convictions of crimes of moral turpitude. [The judicial recommendation provision] does

not apply to deportation proceedings brought pursuant to provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act other than [§ 241(a)(4)]." Id. at 869 (citing Jew Ten v. INS, 307 F.2d 832,
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preme Court has stated, however, that deportation, "while it may be
burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment. 17 9 Rather,
a finding of deportability is a decision based on the desire to rid the
country of persons whose presence here is not conducive to the safety
or welfare of society. 0 Denial of a discretionary remedy is based on
the same considerations.81 It could be argued, then, that when a
criminal court convicts an alien but then recommends against deportation, it has, in effect, determined that the alien would not jeopardize the safety and welfare of society; thus, an immigration judge in a
subsequent discretionary hearing should not be allowed to reconsider
the issue.8 2 This argument, however, fails to consider the distinction
between a deportation hearing and an application for discretionary
relief.
Although the objective of deportation and denial of discretionary relief is the same - ridding the country of undesirable aliens a finding of deportability by the Service does not entail the use of
discretion; if an alien belongs to one of the nineteen classes enumerated in INA section 241(a), he is deportable."' For example, if an
alien is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and the sentence is for one year or more, he is deportable under INA section
241(a) (4), regardless of his family ties, history of employment, business or property ties, or other mitigating factors.8 4 On the other
835 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 968 (1963)).
79. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913)). See also TARNISHED

DooR, supra note 21, at 96-101 (discussing Supreme Court's refusal to consider deportation as
punishment).
80. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). The Court in Mahler stated:
Congress ...was not increasing the punishment for the crimes of which petitioners

had been convicted, by requiring their deportation if found undesirable residents. It

was, jn the exercise of its unquestioned right, only seeking to rid the country of

persons who had shown by their career that their continued presence here would not
make for the safety or welfare of society.
Id.at 39.
81. Inre Matin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) ("The immigration judge must
balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability ... with the social and humane considerations presented in his behalf to determine whether the granting of [discretionary) relief appears in the best interests of this country.").

82. If the Service considers the prior conviction when deciding whether discretionary

relief is merited, the issue of whether the alien is undesirable, based in part on his prior conviction, is again being examined.
83. INA § 241(a)(1)-(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)-(19) (1982).
84. See, e.g., DeFigueroa v. INS, 501 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1974) (marriage to a U.S.
citizen does not exempt from deportation). Rather, it is the decision to cancel or terminate a
deportation order that may involve the use of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 242.7 (1986). See also IA
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hand, courts have generally declared 5 that immigration judges are
bound to consider and weigh all factors, favorable or adverse, in deciding matters of discretionary relief such as adjustment of status
and voluntary departure.86
In addition to the distinction between deportation proceedings
and discretionary matters, interpreting the recommendation as binding in discretionary matters leads to disturbing inequities which
Congress could not have intended. As the BIA pointed out in Gonzalez, if no criminal action has been brought against an alien, his involvement in the criminal activity can be considered in an application for discretionary relief.8 7 To prohibit an immigration judge from
considering an actual conviction for which a recommendation has
been obtained in deciding a discretionary measure tips the balance in
favor of the convicted alien. The Giambanco ruling places an alien
with a conviction and a recommendation in a better position than an
alien who has not been tried and convicted of his crime, but rather
has been subjected only to deportation proceedings.88

Strictly applying Delgado-Chavez's plain language reasoning
that the judicial recommendation is not binding in matters of discretionary relief may at times seem harsh, since denial of a discretionC. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 5.3e(1) (administrative officials may withhold or cancel deportation proceedings for compassionate or humanitarian reasons). Deportation proceedings canceled or withheld for compassionate or humanitarian reasons, previously
known as nonpriority cases, are now designated as "deferred action" cases, and are designed
"to ameliorate excessive severities in selective cases." Id. § 5.3e(7). See generally Wildes, The
Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and NaturalizationService Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom ofInformation Act, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 42 (1976) (discussing
nonpriority cases). By enacting INA § 241(b)(2), Congress in effect injected some amount of
discretion into a nondiscretionary matter (deportation), since the judicial recommendation allows the trial judge convicting the alien to examine factors such as family ties or employment
history in deciding whether to recommend against the alien's deportation. Because a seasonable recommendation prevents deportation, however, the Attorney General (or the Service, as
his representative) is given no discretion in this matter, and the alien may not be deported
based on his conviction. Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. See, e.g., In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978).
86. See id. at 585. See also In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980) (factors
include "alien's prior immigration history, the nature of his entry, and his violations of the
immigration and other laws, as well as the length of residence in this country, close family ties,
and humanitarian needs").
87. 16 I. & N. Dec. at 136 ("Had no criminal action been instituted against the respondent, the fact of his involvement in the criminal activity could have been brought out and
considered in connection with an application for discretionary relief.").
88. See id. The Giambanco ruling, followed in Gonzalez, prevented the Service from
considering Gonzalez's prior conviction when ruling on his application for discretionary relief.
According to the BIA, had Gonzalez not been convicted of his crime, his involvement in the
embezzlement scheme could have been used to deny discretionary relief. Id.
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ary remedy might result in deportation.8 9 The Supreme Court has
stated, however, that considerations such as adjustment of status and
voluntary departure are "matter[s] of discretion and of administrative grace,"9' 0 in which mere compliance with statutory requirements
does not automatically entitle an alien to relief. 91
The Ninth Circuit's position is correct precisely because it recognizes the importance of discretion, while the Third Circuit's reasoning in Giambanco disregards the distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary proceedings, and unfairly benefits the
convicted alien in that circuit.
IV.

THE THIRTY-DAY TIME LIMIT AND REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE
MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY?

The procedural aspects of INA section 241(b)-the thirty-day
time limit and the requirement of prior notice to the Service-have
been the second basis of attack on the statute. As early as 1926, a
court held that the time limit must be strictly enforced, and recommendations issued after thirty days cannot be given a nunc pro tunc
(retroactive) effect. 92 Although later cases were similarly decided,93
one dissenting opinion in the D.C. Circuit strenuously argued against
strictly enforcing this requirement.9 4 The dissenting judge's position
has been buttressed by decisions in the other circuits. The Second
89. Once an alien is found deportable, he may apply for any and all forms of relief from
deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (1986). The alien may also appeal a finding of deportability to
the BIA. Id. § 242.21. If all appeals and applications for discretionary relief are denied, the
original finding of deportability would necessarily still stand. In Delgado-Chavez,the alien was
found deportable, but he applied for discretionary relief from deportation. 765 F.2d at 868-69.
The immigration judge denied relief, citing the alien's prior conviction for which a recommendation against deportation had been obtained. Id. at 869. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in holding that a recommendation is not binding in matters of discretionary relief,
affirmed the finding of deportability and denial of discretionary relief. Id. at 868, 870. Thus,
the recommendation prevented the alien's deportation on the basis of his first crime, but this
prior conviction was an adverse factor to be considered when he subsequently violated the
immigration laws by overstaying his visa. See id. at 869. In the Third Circuit, discretionary
relief cannot be denied based on a prior conviction for which a recommendation has been
obtained because of the Giambanco ruling. If Delgado-Chavez had arisen in the Third Circuit,
the application for discretionary relief probably would not have been denied, based on
Glambanco, and the alien could have voluntarily departed the country instead of being
deported.
90. United States ex rel Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957) (footnote
omitted).
91. Id.
92. United States ex rel Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926).
93. See cases cited supra note 17.
94. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Fahy, J., dissenting).
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Circuit has held that the notice requirement, if defective, should not
bar an otherwise good recommendation,95 and the Seventh Circuit
has agreed.9
Case Law Analysis of Section 241(b) Procedure
97
In Velez-Lozano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the D.C. Circuit strictly enforced the thirty-day time limit for making a recommendation against deportation,98 but reached that decision reluctantly. 99 In this case, the alien was convicted of consensual
sodomy, a crime of moral turpitude, 100 on August 8, 1969,101 and
received a three-year suspended sentence.10 2 On December 11, 1969,
deportation proceedings were initiated by the Service against the
alien under INA section 241(a)(4) (committing a crime of moral
turpitude).10 3 The state sentencing judge, by letter dated January 28,
1970, stated that he would have recommended against deportation
within the thirty-day limit had he been aware of the statutory time
limit at the time of sentencing. 04 On appeal from the BIA decision,
which refused to give a belated recommendation retroactive effect,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed on the basis of stare decisis. However, the
majority added that "[d]eportation here would be harsh and unjustifiable. While the Service has the legal power and authority this
court hopes that they take a moment to examine the equities of this
case before proceeding further."' 0 5 A dissenting opinion would have
granted a belated recommendation retroactive effect and, further,
concluded that a delayed recommendation would satisfy the notice
requirement.' 08
In his dissent, Judge Fahy argued that construing the time limit
as mandatory, i.e., essential to the validity of the recommendation
A.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Hailer v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1968).
Cerujo v. INS, 570 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1978).
463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1308.

99. Id. The court was troubled because "a deportation ... will now occur because of
failings in the trial judge and petitioner's trial counsel" to procure a timely recommendation.

Id. at 1308.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id.
Id. See id.at 1309 for exact contents of the sentencing judge's letter.
Id.at 1308 (emphasis in original).

106.

Id. at 1308, 1310, The majority never discussed the issue of whether the notice

requirement would be met by a delayed recommendation. See id.at 1305-08.
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against deportation, would be inconsistent with a long established
principle of statutory construction: 10 7 "where the time, or manner of
performing the action directed by the statute is not essential to the
purpose of the statute," the time or matter provision would generally

be interpreted as directory only,108 and strict compliance with the
provision would not be essential to the validity of the action. The
dissent further emphasized that a mandatory construction of the
thirty-day limit would also be inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions which have construed statutes involving the possible deportation of an alien in a lenient manner, especially when the language of
the statute is ambiguous.10 9
Reasoning that legislative intent should be controlling, 110 Judge
Fahy also concluded that neither Congress' desire to facilitate informed judicial decisionmaking, nor its concern with avoiding the
possibility of pressure being exerted on a judge, would be served by a
mandatory construction of the time provision. 1

To Judge Fahy, it

was clear from the letter of January 28, 1970, that the time lapse
did not affect the freshness of the facts in the sentencing judge's
mind.1 1 2 In addition, at the time of sentencing, the trial judge's disposition against deportation was apparent;X1, thus, concerns about
pressure being exerted on the judge were irrelevent.1

14

Finally, Judge

Fahy concluded that under a mandatory construction of the time
provision, the basic purpose behind the statute-to make the trial

judge's recommendation available to the alien and the authori107. Id. at 1311.
108. Id. (quoting 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STAT. CONST. § 2804 (1943)). Sutherland further
states, "Although directory provisions are not intended by the legislature to be disregarded, the
seriousness of noncompliance is not considered so great that liability automatically attaches for
failure to comply." IA J. SUTHERLAND, STAT. CONST., § 25.03 (4th ed. 1985). Furthermore,
the statute "should be construed according to its subject matter and the purpose for which it
was enacted." Id.
109. 463 F.2d at 1311. In Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), the Court
stated, "We resolve the doubts in favor of the [lenient] construction because deportation is a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.
... Id. at 10. See also
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (stating that "[tihe hazards to which we
are now asked to subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory scheme").
110. 463 F.2d at 1311.
111. Id. at 1312.
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
113. 463 F.2d at 1309 (trial judge's letter stating that "defendant's violation of the law
was an unfortunate response to an exceptional situation rather than evidence of an antisocial
pattern of behavior").
114.

Id. at 1312.
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ties-would be defeated.1 15
In ascertaining that the notice requirement would be met by a
delayed recommendation, Judge Fahy relied both upon principles of
statutory construction and on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Haller v. Esperdy.116 In Haller, a timely recommendation was made but
no notice was given to the Service. 117 The court held that the judge's
recommendation itself provided sufficient notice to the Service. l 8
The court required, however, that the Service have an opportunity to
urge the judge to reconsider his recommendation.1 1 9 Thus, according
to Haller, if a sentencing judge was willing to reconsider his recommendation and allow the Service to argue against it, the notice requirement would be satisfied.120
The Seventh Circuit has also considered the situation in which a
recommendation against deportation was made but no presentencing
notice was given to the Service. In Cerujo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,1 21 the alien argued that the judicial recommendation against deportation precluded the use of his prior conviction as a
basis for deportation, 2 2 even though the Service was not represented
when the recommendation was made. 123 To strengthen his argument,
the alien submitted an affidavit stating that the sentencing judge was
still willing to hear the views of the Service to reconsider or reaffirm
115. Id. at 1312-13.
116. Id. at 1310-13; Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1968). In Hailer, the
Second Circuit held that the requirement of notice was, in effect, directory; by giving effect to
a recommendation where no prior notice was given to the Service, the court held that this
requirement was not essential to the validity of the recommendation. 397 F.2d at 214-15. By
analogizing to Haller,the majority in Velez-Lozano might have been able to construe the time
limit as directory. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (Cerujo analogizing time limit to
notice requirement, both being directory). For a discussion of the principles of statutory construction used in Judge Fahy's analysis, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
117. 397 F.2d at 213. The court conceded that the burden of giving notice would presumably be on the alien defendant, but in this case the trial court explicitly assumed the
burden. Thus, the alien could not be charged with the default. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 215.
120. See id. (holding that the recommendation made without notice to the Service "will
prevent use of [the] conviction as a basis for deportation until such time as the Service
presents its views in opposition, if any, to the sentencing court, and that Court acts upon
them").
121. 570 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1978).
122. Deportation proceedings were begun pursuant to INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(4) (1982) (alien is deportable if convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude).
In Cerujo, the alien had been convicted of theft, and damage to property and attempted theft.
570 F.2d at 1324. The recommendation was obtained for the second conviction of property
damage and attempted theft. See id. at 1324-25.
123. 570 F.2d at 1325.
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his recommendation.124 Citing both Hailerand Judge Fahy's dissent
in Velez-Lozano, the court held that the requirement of notice was
directory, not mandatory, but limited its decision to certain circumstances. 125 These circumstances require that the sentencing judge
still be available and willing to reconsider his recommendation, and
that there be no evidence that the alien's role in the failure to give
the Service notice was intentional.1 21 If these conditions are met and
the sentencing judge reaffirms his recommendation, even after hear17
ing arguments from the Service, the recommendation is binding.
B. Should a ProceduralDefect Nullify a Judicial
Recommendation?
The legislative purpose for imposing the thirty-day limit for
making the recommendation against deportation is primarily to assure that the trial judge has all of the relevant facts fresh in his
mind when he makes the recommendation. 28 In situations such as
the one presented in Velez-Lozano, where a judge learns of the recommendation provision after the thirty-day limit, but still remembers the facts of the case and is willing to make a recommendation,
the legislative purpose would not be defeated by disregarding the
time limit. On the contrary, construing the limit as mandatory may
defeat the statute's intent to prevent the alien's double punishment
of serving a sentence and then being deported. 29 Furthermore, if accepted principles of statutory construction are applied,' a0 the thirtyday time limit and, by analogy, the notice requirement should be
3
read as directory rather than mandatory.
Several courts have sidestepped the directory-versus-mandatory
debate surrounding the procedural requirements of the judicial recommendation provision. Instead, these courts have examined the is32
sue of whether an alien was denied effective assistance of counsel
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1326-27.
126. Id. at 1327. See also id. at 1325 (suggesting that an additional factor is that no
prejudice to the government be proven).
127. Id. at 1327.
128. See supra text accompanying note 36.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 33.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
131. See Cerujo, 570 F.2d at 1325 (citing the dissent in Velez-Lozano for argument that
30-day time limit and, by analogy, the notice requirement should be read as directory and not
mandatory).
132. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (defendant in criminal prosecution has right to effective
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of prosecution).
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when not informed of the deportation consequences that may result
from a conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere.1 3 For exam-

ple, in People v. Pozo,1 " the court vacated the guilty plea and judgment of conviction because defendant's attorney knew that defendant was an alien, failed to research the law regarding the
immigration consequences which would result from a guilty plea,
and neglected to petition the sentencing court for a recommendation
13 5
against deportation.
133. See generally Comment, The Right Of The Alien To Be Informed Of Deportation
Consequences Before EnteringA Plea Of Guilty Or Nolo Contendere, 21 SAN DiEco L. REV.
195 (1983). Since 1977, several states have enacted laws requiring that, prior to acceptance of
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a punishable criminal offense, an alien must be advised
that conviction for such offense may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization. If an alien is not so advised, on defendant's motion,
the court must vacate judgment and permit the alien to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere and to enter a plea of not guilty. See, e.g. CAL PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West
1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1j; (West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 29D
(West 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200 (West Supp.
1986).
134. 712 P.2d 1044 (Colo. App. 1985).
135. Id. at 1047. Since the time limit for making a recommendation had expired, the
alien in Pozo probably chose the wiser of two strategies, based on current case law: petitioning
the court to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his conviction rather than asking the court
to issue a nunc pro tunc recommendation. It may have been more efficient,-however, to permit
the sentencing court to hear arguments in deciding whether or not to grant a belated recommendation, instead of withdrawing the plea and allowing the alien to plead anew. Upon a plea
of not guilty, or if found guilty, the alien would then be allowed to petition the court for a
recommendation against deportation. Cases decided in accord with Pozo include Lyons v.
Pearce, 298 Or. 554, 694 P.2d 969 (1985); Commonwealth v. Wellington, 305 Pa. Super. 24,
451 A.2d 223 (1982); Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Contra
Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that alien cannot collaterally attack
the legitimacy of a state criminal conviction in a deportation proceeding by contending he was
denied effective counsel when attorney failed to advise him of deportation consequences as a
result of guilty plea); State v. Chung, 210 N.J. Super. 427, 510 A.2d 72 (1986) (stating it is
not the responsibility of court to advise alien of deportation consequences at time of guilty
plea). Earlier cases held that where the sole purpose of vacating and reentering judgment is to
make a seasonable recommendation against deportation, the recommendation is not effective.
See United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1959); In re S-, 9 I. &
N. Dec. 613, 618 (BIA 1962).
A unique situation arose in the recent case of United States v. Shonde, 803 F.2d 937 (8th
Cir. 1986), where the court, on its own initiative, "informally" recommended against deportation. The alien in Shonde pled guilty to unlawful dealing in food stamps, received two years'
probation, and the district court ordered that the alien not be deported. The court also ordered
that if further deportation proceedings ensued, it would hear defendant's motion to vacate his
guility plea. Id. at 938. When the alien was subsequently brought up on deportation charges,
the district court entertained his motion, vacated the plea, and dismissed the indictment. Id.
On appeal, the government contended that the district court did not have the authority to
recommend against deportation and to vacate the conviction. The court of appeals, however,
affirmed. Id.
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In Janvier v. United States, 3 6 the Second Circuit expanded
Pozo's effective assistance of counsel analysis by concluding that the
recommendation against deportation is part of the sentencing pro-

cess, "a critical stage of the prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment safeguards are applicable.' 37 Accordingly, by having judgment vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and
having judgment entered anew, an alien can then petition for a
timely recommendation. 138 By adopting a directory interpretation of
the thirty-day limit and notice requirement, courts need not correct a
perceived injustice by vacating pleas and judgments to accomplish
indirectly what cannot be done directly.
V.

CONCLUSION

The judicial recommendation against deportation is a small part
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but this provision "extends
to the alien an important right or privilege." 3 9 Unfortunately, many
criminal lawyers and many courts are unaware of the requirements
of the provision. 40 Additionally, if a criminal attorney initially representing the alien is not familiar with immigration laws, he or she
may not be aware that deportation may occur as a result of an
alien's conviction or guilty plea.'" The ambiguity of the language of

this section, coupled with the scant legislative history, has apparently
left courts guessing as to the precise mode of its application.
The inherent nature of the term "discretionary relief" necessi136. 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. Id. at 455. The district court in Janvier never reached the question of whether
defendant's counsel had been defective, ruling instead that the alleged ineffective counsel had
occured at a time other than a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. Id. at 450.
138. Id. at 455-56. The Janviercourt did not decide whether counsel had been ineffective; this was to be decided on remand. Id. at 456. If the alien had been deprived of his sixth
amendment rights, however, his sentence would be vacated and argument heard on whether or
not to recommend against deportation. Id.
139. Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1958).
140. See I TRELLES & BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT's LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 636-37 (1979). See generally Appleman, The Recommendation Against Deportation, 58 A.B.A. J. 1294, 1284 (1972) (indicating that attorneys
learn of the recommendation provision after an alien is sentenced and deportation proceedings
are commenced).
141. See Comment, supra note 133, at 195. This is not to say that ignorance of the law
is an excuse. Where strong arguments exist for viewing the time and notice requirements as
directory, however, it seems better to do so than to construe the requirements as mandatory.
Otherwise, courts may be more willing to entertain suits for inefficient counsel, reenter judgment, and allow the trial counsel and judge to make a timely and proper recommendation,
rather than nullify a procedurally defective recommendation and subject an alien to deportation proceedings.
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tates the exercise of administrative discretion in deciding whether to
grant such relief. When a recommendation against deportation prevents an immigration judge from considering a prior conviction in
deciding a discretionary measure, this exercise of discretion is necessarily hindered. Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit asserts, the plain
language of the judicial recommendation provision and the legislative purpose supporting it seem to limit its powers to preventing the
deportation of an alien convicted under INA section 241 (a) (4) (committing a crime of moral turpitude). Consequently, without further
clarification from Congress, the judicial recommendation should not
be binding in discretionary matters.
While the scope of the recommendation provision of the INA
should not be broadened in the absence of Congressional action, the
procedural requirements of the provision seem to lend themselves
more readily to a broader interpretation. Accepted principles of statutory construction would justify a directory interpretation of the
thirty-day time limit and notice requirement. Case law has already
accepted a directory view of the notice requirement, and by analogy,
the time limit should also be viewed as directory. Finally, where the
legislative intent is not hampered by a directory application of the
requirements, a procedurally defective recommendation should not
bar a sincere judicial effort to prevent an alien's deportation.
Marisa A. Marinelli
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